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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, the nature of organizational discourse is theoretically underpinned by the concept of self-serving 
attributions, a type of causal reasoning that allows the writer to take credit for good news and avoid blame for 
bad news. We incorporated signaling theory to the extant theoretical framework for self-serving attributions in 
order to develop hypotheses for the expected levels of attributional bias in the justification of organizational 
performance. A sample of 49 companies was selected, both from a bad year and a good year regarding the 
capital market context. Each company’s Letter to Shareholders was content analyzed in order to test our 
propositions concerning the presence and intensity of self-serving attributions in that section of annual reports. 
The results partially corroborate the proposed theoretical hypotheses, but the sample size is an issue in terms of 
robustness. Nevertheless, the results indicate that companies attempt to create a positive corporate image to 
external stakeholders even when negative performance occurs in a clearly favorable external context. Moreover, 
we observed that companies with positive performance in a good external context blame negative effects on the 
environment in a proportion equivalent to that observed for companies with positive performance in a bad year. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Self-serving attributional patterns are usually manifested in the justification of organizational 
performance by a tendency to associate positive events to internal causes and negative events to 
external ones. The pattern is identified as opportunistic, biased or hedonic, because it allows one to 
take credit for successes and to avoid blame for failures (Staw, Mckechnie, & Puffer, 1983). It has also 
been associated with impression management, a term that embraces a diverse set of strategic behaviors 
aimed at controlling others’ perception of oneself (Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Schelenker & Weigold, 
1992).  
The use of self-serving attributions is a class of impression management behavior that has long been 
researched in the psychological and organizational literature, including accounting. Staw (1980), 
Bettman and Weitz (1983), Staw et al. (1983), Salancik and Meindl (1984), Clapham and Schwenk 
(1991), Aerts (1994, 2001, 2005), Tsang (2002), and Clatworthy and Jones (2003) have contributed to 
the analysis of self-serving tendencies at the organizational level. 
By and large, research on the use of self-serving attributions is based on psychological theories that 
postulate either motivational or informational explanations for this organizational behavior. The 
motivational theory is associated with retrospective rationality and ego-defensive behavior, observed 
in situations of unfavorable outcomes (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Staw, 1980). An informational 
explanation has been derived either from bounded rationality premises or from attributional principles 
of discounting and augmentation (Aerts, 2001; Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Tsang, 2002).  
The motivational explanation is commonly associated with attempts to manage the corporate image 
(Staw, 1980; Salancik & Meindl, 1984). The informational explanation, in turn, is based either on 
biased internal information processing capabilities (Miller & Ross, 1975) or on other reasoning 
processes related to the interpretation of environmental events (Huff & Schwenk, 1990; Kelley, 1971). 
Results from empirical studies have been controversial. Bettman and Weitz’s (1983) results pointed 
in mixed directions, and Staw et al. (1983), Clatworthy and Jones (2003) and Aerts (2005) presented 
evidence that supports the motivational explanation. Tsang (2002) found evidence to support the 
informational hypothesis in a sample of Singaporean companies’ reports, the same tendency observed 
by Clapham and Schwenk (1991) in annual reports from US companies. However, Tsang’s (2002) 
rationale is based on cross-cultural variations, while Clapham and Schwenk (1991) suggest an 
interpretation based on sense making processes. 
This work is the first to propose and test hypotheses derived from both motivational and 
informational theories, rather than attempting to eliminate one of them. We combine an analysis of 
contextual events with propositions from both motivational and informational theories in order to 
predict the presence and intensity of self-serving attributions in the justification of organizational 
performance. Contextual events, in the form of mixed combinations of good (bad) year and high (low) 
performers, are assumed to exert influence on the relative weights of motivational and informational 
drivers in the process of justification of organizational performance. We also incorporate propositions 
of signaling theory (Spence, 1973) to the rationale of self-serving attributions.  
This study also contributes to the literature on self-serving attributions by providing results produced 
in a different institutional setting, based on Aerts’ (2005) suggestions that the explanation patterns 
displayed by companies from different countries are subject to cultural influences. Brazil’s 
institutional setting is usually depicted as a weak institutional environment (Anderson, 1999), and the 
country is held to have a poor legal regime, enforcement and transparency (Durnev & Kim, 2005). 
Additionally, Lopes (2006) suggests that Brazilian firms rely on private deals to obtain funding, which 
reduces the informativeness of accounting reports, and Lopes, Tukamoto and Galdi (2007) conclude 
that the high level of discretion associated with a poor institutional environment and low level of 
monitoring creates the conditions for earnings management to emerge. Thus, Brazil’s institutional Izabella Frinhani Tessarolo, Marcelo Sanches Pagliarussi, Antonio Thadeu Mattos da Luz 
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setting leads us to suspect that managers can exercise higher levels of discretion in the process of 
corporate image management.  
Our sample consists of 49 companies from the Economatica database. We analyzed the Letter to 
Shareholders from the annual reports for each company in the years of 2002, classified as a bad year, 
and 2003, a good year. Each Letter to Shareholders was content analyzed in order to identify and code 
attributions presented in sentences that discussed performance issues.  
The results partially support the theoretical hypotheses developed here. Nevertheless, we observed 
that the narrative sections of annual reports in Brazil are marked by the presence of significant levels 
of self-serving attributions. The results indicate that companies attempt to create a positive corporate 
image to external stakeholders even when negative performance occurs in a clearly favorable external 
context. Additionally, we observed that companies with positive performance in a good external 
context blame negative effects on the environment in a proportion equivalent to that observed for 
companies with positive performance in a bad year. 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Staw (1980) and Staw et al. (1983) were probably the first authors to introduce the management of 
public impressions rationale to analyze the textual portion of corporate annual reports. Using the 
impression management theory that had been previously developed by psychology researchers, Staw 
(1980) argued that both individuals and organizations strive for rational and goal-oriented behavior. 
Nevertheless, actions generally fall short of these ideals, which motivate individuals to rationalize or 
justify their course of action. The farther the results are from the ideal, the greater the forces that drive 
the justification process (Staw, 1980). This process involves both self-justification as well as an 
external form of justification termed impression management (Staw, 1980). 
Moving from the individual to the organizational level, Staw et al. (1983) tested for the presence of 
self-serving attributions in organizations’ reporting of performance information. One of their research 
goals was to determine whether self-serving attributions are best explained by either an internal form 
of justification, expressed by the use of defensiveness attributions, or by an external form, which 
involves the use of enhancing attributions (Staw et al., 1983). Moreover, defensive attributions are 
observed as a pattern of crediting positive events to internal sources and negative events to external 
factors (Staw et al. 1983). Staw et al. (1983) successfully demonstrated the existence of self-serving 
attributions in the Letter to Shareholders, but they did not find organizational performance to 
determine causal attributions, as they expected. 
Bettman and Weitz’s (1983) study was centered on the analysis of reasoning patterns in the 
justification of corporate performance in order to shed light on the nature of self-serving attributions. 
They developed motivational hypotheses for the use of self-serving attributions based on ego-
defensive rationalizations. Also, they used Kelley’s (1971) attributional principles of discounting and 
augmentation, which involve the search for plausible arguments to explain the occurrence of 
performance related events, to develop the informational hypotheses for the use of self-serving 
attributions. 
The informational rationale of discounting and augmentation proposes that, when an unfavorable 
outcome occurs in a good year there are fewer plausible external causes to assign to the outcome 
(Bettman & Weitz, 1983). On the other hand, if an unfavorable outcome occurs in a bad year, the role 
of external causes would be more relevant (Kelley, 1971). 
Bettman and Weitz (1983) observed the typical self-serving pattern of attributions in the Letter to 
Shareholders, but neither a purely informational nor a purely motivational explanation was supported 
by these attributions. The results for unfavorable outcomes supported the informational explanation, The Justification of Organizational Performance in Annual Report Narratives  
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while the results for favorable outcomes appeared to be more consistent with the motivational 
explanation (Bettman & Weitz, 1983). 
Tsang (2002) analyzed the Letters to Shareholders of 94 firms listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange from 1985, classified as a bad year and 114 companies in 1994, a good year, in an attempt 
to replicate Bettman and Weitz’s (1983) study. According to Tsang, although Bettman and Weitz’s 
data did not allow them to clearly demonstrate that only one hypothesis prevailed, the informational 
explanation was strongly supported by Tang’s data. 
In addition, Tsang (2002) provided solid evidence for the informational explanation, and made a 
significant contribution to the motivational–informational debate by bringing cross-cultural 
differences to the analysis. He suggested that a critical cultural difference exists between East Asian 
managers and Western managers in explaining self-serving attributions. Tsang interpreted that Asian 
managers are prone to adopt a more holistic perspective than their Western counterparts in the decision 
making process, which results in more objective and higher quality decisions. Also, “Singapore 
managements, compared with their Western counterparts, tended to have a more stable amount of 
causal reasoning across different outcome scenarios” (Tsang, 2002, p. 62). 
Despite his discussion about cross-cultural differences, Tsang (2002) did not translate it into 
hypotheses subject to empirical testing. The author also presented motivational and informational 
motives as rival explanations but he did not report how he tried to eliminate one of them. Moreover, he 
did not discuss whether the explanations overlap or interact. 
Salancik and Meindl (1984) presented a longitudinal study that examined the reasons given by CEOs 
to explain their firms' performance in the Letter to Shareholders over an 18-year period, comparing 
firms with stable and unstable performance. They observed that, contrary to psychological theories, 
managers of firms with unstable performance claim responsibility for both positive and negative 
outcomes more than the managements of firms with stable performance do. Managers of firms with 
unstable performance also seemed reluctant to attribute poor performance to uncontrollable 
environmental events. They argued that this provides evidence that, as the lack of real control over 
organizational outcomes increases, managers of these firms strategically manipulate causal attributions 
to manage impressions of their control (Salancik & Meindl, 1984). 
A tendency of managers to credit themselves for positive outcomes and blame negative effects on 
the environment was also observed in Salancik and Meindl’s (1984) results. The authors argued that 
the low correlation between attributional tendencies with past performance suggests that these 
management tendencies are more likely to result from presentational biases. They also suggested that 
“the evidence points to the possibility that attributional styles result from intentional strategic attempts 
to create a sense of management's effectiveness and control over the welfare of the corporation” 
(Salancik & Mendl, 1984, p. 252). 
Clapham and Schwenk (1991) explored whether the use of self-serving attributions represents 
attempts to manage corporate image. They investigated annual reports from heavily regulated 
companies with the premise that “attempts at impression management through the use of self-serving 
attributions would be more readily detected by the regulatory agency and less likely to be effective” 
(Clapham & Schwenk, 1991, p. 221). Thus, one should expect a weaker and more subtle pattern of 
self-serving attributions in regulated industries, which could be interpreted as evidence that the use of 
these attributions is due to impression management aims (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991). Conversely, if 
the pattern of attributions is derived from informational issues, the regulatory context should not 
necessarily affect it and one could expect the same levels of self-serving attributions in annual reports 
(Clapham & Schwenk, 1991). 
Their results (1991, p. 226) showed the same basic pattern of attributions, since they observed that 
“executives tended to take credit for good outcomes and lay blame on the environment for poor 
outcomes”. They also brought up Huff and Schwenk’s (1985) propositions to suggest that the Izabella Frinhani Tessarolo, Marcelo Sanches Pagliarussi, Antonio Thadeu Mattos da Luz 
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attributional pattern often found in annual reports results from a type of cognitive bias which affects 
how managers recall events that occurred before positive and negative outcomes. 
Aerts (1994), more than a decade after Bettman and Weitz (1983) and Staw et al. (1983), was the 
first author to add an accounting dimension in the research about self-serving attributes. The author 
proposed the compelling argument that accounting logic is the source of technical-calculatory 
relationships that can be rhetorically transformed into attributions of causality (Aerts, 1994). For 
instance, he pointed out that managers explain financial actions and results using the internal logic of 
the financial accounting model.  
In the context of self-serving attributions, Aerts (1994) introduced the accounting bias as “a 
tendency to explain negative performance more in technical accounting terms” (p. 341), with positive 
performance being expressed more in strict cause-effect terms. His overall results reinforced findings 
in other studies. He also argued that the accounting explanation interacts with the self-serving 
attributional pattern, in which the former “obscures the perception of the tendency to use (external) 
excuses and justifications” (Aerts, 1994, p. 349). 
In a subsequent study, Aerts (2001) used a research design suitable for evaluating the relative 
strength of consistency and inertial forces on the attributional behavior in annual reports. He proposed 
that an interaction between listing status and performance history constrains the variability of the 
attributional content over time. This implies that the attributional content, as well as other explanation 
patterns, would be very similar year after year (Aerts, 2001). 
Aerts (2001) drew on the propositions of Gibbins, Richardson, and Waterhouse (1990) to explain 
and predict corporate financial disclosures. Gibbins et al. (1990) developed a theory supported by two 
initial dimensions of the disclosure process: “an uncritical acceptance of rules and norms and a 
propensity to seek firm-specific advantage in how disclosures are made and interpreted” (p. 122). 
These two dimensions are affected by “market factors as well as firm-specific factors” (Gibbins et al., 
1990, p. 122). The authors also argued that the disclosure attributes are managed not only with relation 
to what is presented or absent from the narratives, but also with respect to their timing and 
interpretation.  
Furthermore, a firm’s disclosure history, what Gibbins et al. (1990) termed the disclosure position’s 
ritualistic dimension, also affects the prevalent disclosure position, in an effect similar to the concept 
of path dependence. Based on this, Aerts (2001) argued that disclosure procedures can be embedded in 
organizational routines, marked by an uncritical adherence to prescribed disclosure norms that cause 
these procedures to tend toward persistence. According to Aerts (2001), organizational inertia derives 
from spontaneous habits, the existence of structures and routines, professional standards, education 
and training, precedents, rituals and traditions. 
Aerts (2001) elaborated further on the financial performance forces that trigger corporate verbal 
behavior. He asserts that high economic performance and low risk are assumed to signal the intrinsic 
quality of management. In addition, accounting data constitute the primary source of information for 
the interpretation of a company’s economic performance. Thus, the presentation of accounting 
numbers tangibly associated with an unstable performance should be accompanied by some kind of 
narrative justification, since management’s reputation is at stake. 
The results of Aerts’ (2001) longitudinal study indicated that the attributional content presented in 
accounting narratives showed a high degree of stability over time, arguing against a purely calculative 
view of attributional behavior. Also, evidence of an inertial effect of company listing status and 
performance history was also deemed to affect the assertiveness aspects of attributional behavior and 
the differential use of accounting language in the explanation of financial accounting outcomes (Aerts, 
2001). 
Clatworthy and Jones (2003) motivated their study on the importance and usefulness of accounting 
narratives. The authors continued the current of research established by Aerts (1994, 2001), which The Justification of Organizational Performance in Annual Report Narratives  
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incorporates an accounting rather than a managerial perspective. Their results buttressed the idea that 
accounting narratives are an important data source to study the management of corporate image. 
In consonance with Aerts’ (1994) propositions, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) found that companies 
in general avoid explicit causal attributions. The prevalent attributional strategy observed was to avoid 
specific blame for bad news. They also argued that improving performers are more assertive in the 
language they use in their annual reports. 
Aerts (2005) treated the capital market context as a critical variable to discern situations of strong 
and weak motivational influences on the use of self-serving attributions. He considered that previous 
studies overstated the relative importance of the informational explanation in their attempts to 
understand the presence of biased patterns of attributions. This mistake is derived from the fact that 
most previous research did not consider “the specifics of the social and organizational environment in 
which attributional behaviour occurs” (Aerts, 2005 p. 494). For instance, increased accountability 
demands, as invoked by the capital market context, and retrospective scrutiny are significant 
contextual forces in shaping motivational attributional behavior in listed companies (Aerts, 2005). 
Results from Aerts’ (2005, p. 495) research suggested that “listed companies offer more attributional 
explanations on a wider range of accounting outcomes, although these are not more extensive or 
profound.” It was also observed that “listed companies exhibited a higher degree of defensiveness in 
explaining negative accounting outcomes” (Aerts, 2005, p. 514). Interestingly, the moderate degree of 
attributional defensiveness, in comparison with previous research that used US data, pointed to 
potentially significant cultural influences on the explanation patterns displayed by companies from 
different countries (Aerts, 2005). 
All the previous studies discussed so far documented the asymmetry in the attribution of causality in 
the justification of organizational performance. Our aim here is to use the theoretical rationale 
presented in this section in order to predict the expected levels of attributional bias in the justification 
of organizational performance for a sample of Brazilian listed firms. We also bring signaling theory to 
suggest that companies whose performance is better than that of the market as a whole will seek ways 
to signal the superiority of that performance (Smith & Taffler, 1992) if the signaling costs are lower 
than the expected benefits (Spence, 1973). 
We first consider the case of negative performers in a bad year. Higher levels of ego-defensive 
behavior are expected, since the company’s performance is negative. Even though the ego-
defensiveness is not as high as in the combination of negative performance in a good year context, we 
suggest that the situation of bad performance in a bad year will elicit the highest levels of self-serving 
discourse, since the external conditions can be used to augment the role of external causes. 
Let us now consider the combination of negative performance in a good year. Although ego-
defensiveness is expected to be preeminent, the principle of discount suggests that allegations of 
external causes to justify performance will be discounted by rational readers. A similar situation 
should be observed in the combination of positive performance in a good year context. From the 
signaling perspective, companies in this situation will aim to signal their superior performance, but a 
rational reader will discount excessive allegations to internal causes if they are used to justify 
performance. 
The last case is the combination of positive performance in a negative year. We expect that 
companies in this situation will display the lowest level of self-serving attributions in their discourse, 
since there is neither a need to defend one’s ego nor to signal superior performance.  
From the preceding discussion we present the following hypotheses: 
H1: The presence of self-serving attributions in the CEO’s Message of companies with negative 
performance in a bad year is the highest in comparison with all other combinations of performance and 
context. Izabella Frinhani Tessarolo, Marcelo Sanches Pagliarussi, Antonio Thadeu Mattos da Luz 
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H2: The presence of self-serving attributions in the CEO’s Message of companies with positive 
performance in a bad year is the lowest in comparison with all other combinations of performance and 
context. 
In the next section we present the procedures used to gather data and test the hypotheses proposed. 
 
 
DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODS 
 
 
The annual reports of companies listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange [Bovespa] were sampled 
for the years of 2002 and 2003. Content analysis was performed in the Letter to Shareholders section 
of each annual report. Content analysis has frequently been used in accounting research (Abrahamson 
& Amir, 1996; Bryan, 1997; Jones & Shoemaker, 1994; Smith & Taffler, 2000). 
The Letters to Shareholders were first parsed in sentences for subsequent coding and classification 
according to previously defined rules. The aim of the analysis was to identify and code occurrences of 
causal attributions in a company’s explanations of performance.   
Even though the narrative sections of corporate annual reports as a data source can be regarded as 
comparable between companies, their form of presentation varies a great deal. Since the Letter to 
Shareholders is the most frequently read portion of the annual reports, and is more standardized 
(Clatworthy & Jones, 2006), we chose it as the object of our analysis. 
 
Sampling Procedures  
 
In order to provide variation in the context variable within the sample, a good year and a bad year 
were selected using the per capita gross domestic product and the Ibovespa (Bovespa index) as 
proxies. 
Within a scope to the last ten years, we initially chose 1998 as the bad year. However, annual reports 
were not readily available for that specific year in a satisfactory number, so instead we chose 2002 as 
the bad year.  
In 2002 the per capita GDP decreased 0.32% and the Ibovespa showed a negative variation of 17 
percentage points. We chose 2003, with a 4.19% increase in the per capita GDP and a positive 
variation of 97.33 points in the Ibovespa, as the good year. 
We selected 49 companies to compose the sample based on the criteria that: (1) the company 
presented the Letter to Shareholders in the annual report and (2) information about net earnings was 
available for 2001, 2002 and 2003 in the Economatica database. 
Net income was chosen as a proxy for performance due to its focus on shareholders, who are 
remunerated according to it. It is also the proxy for performance that is easiest for an investor to 
understand. We believe that managers exercise some discretion in net earnings presentation, but since 
we are precisely concerned with the management of corporate image as disclosed by managers, the use 
of net income is justified by the fact that managers will have to provide interpretation for the numbers 
they present. 
 
Coding of Attributions 
 
In each Letter to Shareholders we focused specifically on causal attributions present in performance 
justifications, individually considered. A causal attribution is defined here as a sentence, phrase or 
paragraph in which an argument is built to connect performance results, or effects, with their The Justification of Organizational Performance in Annual Report Narratives  
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respective presumed causes. The unit of analysis was the specific instance of causal reasoning in the 
Letter to Shareholders, following Bettman and Weitz (1983) and Tsang (2002). 
All instances of causal attribution were retained. A total of 1957 phrases were analyzed, and 234 
causal attributions relative to each company’s performance were identified. In these, causes and effects 
were identified and coded. The effects were coded as good news or bad news. The causes were 
classified according to the locus of causality as internal or external. 
An effect was considered good news when reporting an increase in revenue, sales, profits, 
investments, productivity or company growth. On the other hand, reporting a decrease or reduction in 
revenues, sales, profits, productivity, the presence of any kind of loss, closure of plants, etc, was 
considered as bad news. 
Regarding the locus of causality, a cause was considered internal when referring to factors internal 
to the organization, such as company strategies, management decisions, know-how and human 
resources, among others. Otherwise, it was considered external, arising from factors external to the 
organization, such as inflation, market prices, government policies, climate, and so on. 
The coding was performed in a three-phase process: 
I. Ten Letters to Shareholders, from annual reports for 2006 were coded with the purpose of 
establishing the general procedure for identifying and coding causal attributions; 
II. Afterwards, two undergraduate students in accounting and one of the authors independently 
coded the 2002 and 2003 Letters to Shareholders;  
III. The results of the coding were compared and differences resolved by discussions between the 
authors and coders. 
A total of 234 attributions were coded, with an intercoder reliability of .75 in the coding process. 
Most of the disagreements were related to what should be codified as a cause and effect argument. 
This measure of reliability is a little less consistent than in previous studies, but it is in accordance 
with studies about readability of corporate annual reports, which have displayed reading ease scores on 
the borderline between difficult and very difficult to read (Rutherford, 2003). 
Following Bettman and Weitz (1983) and Tsang (2002), we considered attributions individually 
when analyzing the use of self-serving attributional patterns. The next section presents the results and 
discussion. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
Attributional Patterns 
 
To delve into the patterns of argumentation observed in the sample of listed Brazilian companies, we 
prepared contingency tables for each variable and its respective associations. Each table was submitted 
to Chi-square tests to determine whether the association between variables was due to chance.  
Contingency tables are used for categorical data analysis and they consist of tables of frequencies 
classified according to two or more sets of categorical variables. Table 1 presents the aggregated 
results for the coding of effects and their respective locus of causality. The null hypothesis predicts no 
association between the coding of effects and the locus of causality. Under this hypothesis, expected 
frequencies in each cell are calculated by multiplying together the two marginal totals and dividing the 
product by the grand total (Morettin & Bussab, 2003). For instance, the expected number in the cell at Izabella Frinhani Tessarolo, Marcelo Sanches Pagliarussi, Antonio Thadeu Mattos da Luz 
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the first row and first column of Table 1 is given by multiplying 171 by 180 and dividing this number 
by 234, which results in 131.5. 
In order to obtain the test statistic one needs to compute (Morettin & Bussab, 2003): 
∑
−
=
cells   all
2
2
number   expected
) number   expected number    observed (
χ  
The self-serving pattern of attributions is apparent in the shaded gray cells, since 90% of the good 
news is associated with internal causes. Also, 83.3% of the bad news is associated with external 
causes. This pattern of association is significant at 1%, as indicated by the Chi-square statistics (p-
value < 0.01). 
 
Table 1: 
 
Aggregated Results from Locus of Causality and the Polarity of the News Presented in the 
Letter to Shareholders 
 
   2002 and 2003   
      Internal External  Total 
Observed 162 18 
Expected 131.5  48.5 
% of Total  69.2%  7.7% 
% of Row  90%  10% 
Good News 
% of Column  94.7%  28.6% 
180 (76.9%) 
Observed 9 45 
Expected 39.5  14.5 
% of Total  3.9%  19.2% 
Bad News 
% of Row  16.7%  83.3% 
54 (23.1%) 
 171  63  234 
Total  
   73.1%  26.9%  100% 
cl =  0.01  Df  Critical  Value  p-value 
Chi
2  1 6.6349 113.5398 0.0000 
 
Following the same logic, we disaggregated the data by year in order to investigate the occurrence of 
self-serving attribution in each year. Tables 2 and 3 present the association between the locus of 
causality and the polarity of news observed for the years of 2002 and 2003.  
 The Justification of Organizational Performance in Annual Report Narratives  
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Table 2: 
 
Causal Attribution and Polarization of News in a Good Year 
 
      2003 
    Pos. Performance  Neg. Performance 
      Internal External Internal External
Total 
Observed  77 14  15 2 
Expected 67.2  18.7  12.8  9.4  Good News 
% of Total  60.6%  11%  11.8%  1.6% 
108 (85%) 
 
Observed 2 8 0 9 
Expected 11.8  3.3  2.2  1.6  Bad News 
% of Total  1.6%  6.3%  0.00%  7.1% 
19 (15%) 
 
 79  22  15  11  127 
Total  
   62.2%  17.3%  11.8%  8.7%  100% 
cl =  0.01  Df  Critical  Value  p-value 
Chi
2  3 11.3449  58.8004  0.0000 
Again, the association between internal causes and good news and between external causes and 
bad news is significant in both years, as seen in Tables 2 and 3 (p-value < 0.01). 
One can observe in Table 2 that even in a good year companies tend to blame external causes for 
their performance-related bad news. 
 
 
Table 3: 
 
Causal Attribution and Polarization of News in a Bad Year 
 
     2002 
    Pos. Performance Neg. Performance 
      Internal External Internal External 
Total 
Observed  46 2 24 0 
Expected  35.7 10.8 16.1  9.4  Good News 
% of Total  43%  1.9%  22.4%  0.00% 
72 (67.3%) 
 
Observed 7  14 0  14 
Expected 17.3  5.2 7.9  4.6  Bad News 
% of Total  6.5%  13.1%  0.00%  13.1% 
35 (32.7%) 
 
  53 16 24  14  107 
Total 
   49.5%  15%  22.4%  13.1%  100% 
cl =  0.01  Df  Critical   Value   p-value 
Chi
2  3 11.3449  71.4469  0.0000 
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Another noteworthy observation is that the proportion of good news relative to the overall coded 
effects is not different from a good year to a bad year (0.85 and 0.67, p-value = 0.23). This result is 
consistent with previous studies, which found that no matter how bad the performance is, the tone of 
the Letter to Shareholders is predominantly positive (Clatworthy & Jones, 2003; Hildebrandt & 
Snyder, 1981; Staw et al., 1983). 
Next we proceed to the test of our hypotheses. Table 4 reports the frequencies of attributions 
observed in the Letter to Shareholders for companies in the sample separated by their respective 
combination of performance and external context. Self-serving attributions are shaded grey. 
 
Table 4: 
 
Frequencies of Self-serving Attributions in the Letter to Shareholders for Companies in the 
Sample 
 
Negative Performance  Positive Performance 
Bad Year  Good Year  Bad Year  Good Year  Variables 
(NB) (NG) (PB) (PG) 
Internal Causes  24  15  46  77 
Good News 
External Causes  0 2 2  14 
Internal Causes  0 0 7 2 
Bad News 
External Causes  14  9  14  8 
Proportion of self-serving attributions  1.00  0.92  0.87  0.84 
 
The frequencies of the shaded grey cells in each column of Table 4 were totalized and transformed 
in a proportion of self-serving attributions relative to the total amount of attributions of their respective 
column.  
The results of the tests for differences in proportions obtained in Table 4 are presented now in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: 
 
Results Obtained from Tests for Differences in Proportion of Self-serving Attributions 
Displayed in the Letter to Shareholders 
 
Null hypotheses  p-value  Corroborates H1  Corroborates H2 
NB (1.00) = NG (0.92)  0.04  Yes  - 
NB (1.00) = PG (0.84)  0.01  Yes  - 
NB (1.00) = PB (0.87)  0.01  Yes  - 
PB (0.87) = NB (1.00)  0.01  -  Yes 
PB (0.87) = NG (0.92)  0.47  -  No 
PB (0.87) = PG (0.84)  0.61  -  No 
NB: Negative performers in the Bad year 
PB: Positive performers in the Bad year 
NG: Negative performers in the Good year 
PG: Positive performers in the Good year 
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For companies with a negative performance in a bad year (NB), the proportion of self-serving 
attributions presented in the Letter to Shareholders (1.00) is significantly higher than that of 
companies with a negative performance in a good year (NG) (p-value = 0.04). Moreover, the 
proportion of self-serving attributions of NB companies is higher than companies both with a positive 
performance in a good year (PG, p-value = 0.01) and with a positive performance in a bad year (PB, p-
value = 0.01). These results support hypothesis H1, which posits that the presence of self-serving 
attributions in the Letter to Shareholders of companies with a negative performance in a bad year (NB) 
is the highest in comparison with all other combinations of performance and context.  
It is conceivable that negative performers exhibited more instances of self-serving attributions in a 
bad year due to an effort to provide more explanation for their disappointing operational results. This 
is not the case, since we found that negative performers in a bad year (NB) prepared shorter Letters to 
Shareholders (significant at 0.01 level) and also displayed less occurrences of causal reasoning related 
to their performance (significant at 0.1 level), in comparison with positive performers in a bad year 
context (PB). Also, negative performers in a bad year (NB) presented shorter Letters to Shareholders 
(significant at 0.05 level) and less instances of causal explanation (significant at 0.01 level) in 
comparison with negative performers in a good year (NG).  
In H2 we propose that the presence of self-serving attributions in the Letter to Shareholders of 
companies with a positive performance in a bad year is the lowest in comparison with all other 
combinations of performance and context. H2 is not supported by the results, since in Table 5 one can 
see that the proportion of self-serving attributions displayed by companies with a positive performance 
in bad year (PB) is not different from the proportions presented both by companies with negative 
performance in good year (NG, p-value = 0.47) and by companies with positive performance in a good 
year (PG, p-value = 0.61). 
We did not test for differences in proportions of self-serving attributions between companies with a 
negative performance in a good year (NG) and companies with a positive performance in a good year 
(PG) because this comparison relates to none of our hypotheses. 
The results must be interpreted with caution because the sub-sample sizes are not large enough to 
ensure robustness. However, since nonparametric tests for difference in proportions are not currently 
available in the literature, the results indicate that H1 is corroborated, although H2 is not. 
In order to understand why hypothesis H2 was not corroborated, we performed tests with 
disaggregated proportions within the sample. The tests revealed that companies with negative 
performance in a good year (NG) take credit for the good news in a proportion equivalent to that 
presented by companies with positive performance in bad year (PB), since the p-value for the null 
hypothesis is 0.26. This result implies that NG companies might try to sway the reader’s attention to 
the good news instead of their bad performance.  
Additionally, companies with a positive performance in a good year (PG) blame negative effects on 
the environment in a proportion that is equivalent to that displayed by companies with positive 
performance in a bad year (PB, p-value = 0.445). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This work explored the nature of organizational discourse in different combinations of contexts and 
company performances. The nature of organizational discourse was theoretically underpinned by the 
concept of self-serving attributions, which is a specific instance of causal reasoning that allows the 
writer to take credit for good news and avoid blame for bad news. Izabella Frinhani Tessarolo, Marcelo Sanches Pagliarussi, Antonio Thadeu Mattos da Luz 
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Two samples were selected, one in a bad year and the other in a good year, regarding the capital 
market context. Based on the theoretical propositions on self-serving attributions in annual reports, we 
added contributions from signaling theory in order to develop hypotheses for the expected levels of 
self-serving attributions in the justification for organizational performance. 
Testing the theoretical hypotheses advanced in this study proved difficult, since the size of the sub-
samples used in the comparisons were not as large as needed to ensure robustness. Nevertheless, the 
results corroborated the hypothesis that the presence of self-serving attributions in the Letter to 
Shareholders of companies with a negative performance in a bad year is the highest in comparison 
with all other combinations of performance and context. Yet, contrary to our second hypothesis, 
companies with a positive performance in a bad year did not display the lowest level of self-serving 
attributions in the Letter to Shareholders in comparison with all other combinations of performance 
and context. 
The results also indicate that companies attempt to create a positive corporate image to external 
stakeholders even when negative performance occurs in a clearly favorable external context. 
Additionally, we observed that companies with positive performance in a good external context blame 
negative effects on the environment in a proportion equivalent to that observed for companies with 
positive performance in bad year. Both observations are incompatible with the premise of rational 
readers and they suggest opportunities for additional investigation. 
Our conclusions are subject to a number of limitations. As mentioned, sample size is the first. We 
also suggest that other studies might be developed considering the presence of self-serving attributions 
conditional to corporate governance indexes. This might be an interesting way to incorporate the 
institutional setting in the discussion. 
Contemporaneity is also a motivating issue with respect to Brazilian companies’ annual reports. Due 
to the theoretical hypotheses advanced here, this study used data from 2002 and 2003. To the best of 
our knowledge, no study has been conducted about self-serving attributions in the context of the 
Brazilian capital market, which is gaining increasing economic relevance.  
Moreover, other verbal strategies plausibly associated with impression management may be 
intertwined in a structure that includes legitimacy needs, impression management tactics, accounting 
explanations, the use of attributions, and elements of metadiscourse. It is a challenge to develop 
research designs that allow uncovering the complex relation between these elements. 
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